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TO DAMN OR NOT DAMN A DAM: STAKEHOLDER
COLLABORATION AS A TOOL FOR DAM MANAGEMENT*
ALEC D. TYRA** & NICHOLAS KANDAS***

ABSTRACT
Dams have played an integral role in the development and economic growth of the United States for centuries, and remain important
fixtures in water and energy management. However, after standing for
decades, aging dams across the country are deteriorating or creating harmful environmental impacts that have made them sources of contention in
many river basins. Calls to remove certain dams have been growing and
in recent years have particularly intensified with respect to some large
federally owned or regulated hydroelectric dams. These larger dams are
subject to ongoing environmental review under the National Environmental
Policy Act. Nonfederally owned dams also are subject to review through
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s relicensing process, and
federally owned dams are reviewed by the agencies that own and manage
their operations, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or Bureau of
Reclamation. As dams age, these environmental reviews are generating
increasing discord and litigation among dam operators, landowners, local
communities, Native American Tribes, and environmental activists. Fortunately, as experience in other areas of natural resource management
has shown, collaborative governance regimes that replace or supplement
traditional agency decision-making can often reduce conflicts in large multistakeholder settings. Among other things, well-structured stakeholder
collaboration schemes tend to incorporate more diverse perspectives and
increase public acceptance of agency actions. Recognizing these potential
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advantages, this Article argues that federal agencies should reshape dam
relicensing and reevaluation policies to incorporate more collaborative
elements and outlines specific strategies for pursuing that goal.
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In 2017, California evacuated nearly 200,000 residents from
downstream areas surrounding Oroville Dam on California’s Feather
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River.1 Heavy rains from the previous months had filled the reservoir to the
brim.2 Winter storms also had damaged the dam’s main spillway, preventing releases of water to reduce capacity.3 These circumstances required
dam operators to release water over the top of the dam into an earthen
emergency spillway, increasing erosion on the hillside and threatening
total failure of dam infrastructure.4
More than a decade prior to the Oroville Dam incident, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) had relicensed the operation
of Oroville Dam for hydroelectric power.5 Despite fervent calls at that time
from environmental groups to require reinforcements for the dam’s earthen
emergency spillway and other safety improvements, FERC relicensed the
dam without obligating the California State Department of Water Resources to make any such changes.6 Unfortunately, the hazards at Oroville
were not an isolated incident. There have been numerous dam failures or
near failures across the country in recent years.7 Governments’ general
1

Emauella Grinberg et al., A Race Against the Weather to Avoid Disaster at California’s
Oroville Dam, CNN (Feb. 14, 2017, 12:11 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/13/us/cali
fornia-oroville-dam-spillway-failure/index.html [https://perma.cc/6J95-J2FC] (“Some people
had just a few minutes to prepare to evacuate, in what one Oroville resident described
as ‘pure chaos.’”).
2
Id.
3
Luisa Gattone, Oroville Dam crisis, why 200,000 people near the US’ tallest dam are in
danger, LIFEGATE (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.lifegate.com/oroville-dam-crisis [https://
perma.cc/3F2L-9B5T].
4
Id. (“The latter isn’t built with the same specifications as the main one, which is
controlled by gates and made in concrete, leaving water to flow down the earthen hillside
instead. Its use increases the risk of collapse because when the water starts to erode the
ground, the dirt and water start to roll down the hill, leading to the potential creation of
a 10-metre tall wall of water.”).
5
Kristine Phillips, The Government was Warned that the Oroville Dam Emergency Spillway
Was Unsafe. It Didn’t Listen., WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/02/13/officials-were-warned-the-oroville-dam-emer
gency-spillway-wasnt-safe-they-didnt-listen/ [https://perma.cc/MJW3-SSBM].
6
In its decision to relicense the dam, a federal official stated that “the emergency spillway
meets FERC’s engineering guidelines for an emergency spillway. . . the guidelines specify
that during a rare flood event, it is acceptable for the emergency spillway to sustain
significant damage.” Id. (quoting John Onderdonk, a senior civil engineer for FERC).
7
See, e.g., Moriah Balingit et al., Michigan dam disaster an example of what could happen
in many other communities: Heavy rains influenced by climate change and aging dam infrastructure could spell disaster in many states, WASHINGTON POST (May 23, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/michigan-dam-disaster-infrastructure
/2020/05/22/26bc380a-9c34-11ea-ac72-3841fcc9b35f_story.html [https://perma.cc/2GQU
-VTS6]; Bill Chappell, 18 Dams Breached And Death Toll Rises In S.C. Flooding, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 6, 2015, 2:14 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/10
/06/446352304/s-c-flooding-18-dams-breached-and-death-toll-rises [https://perma.cc/S386
-LHRB]; McKenzie Romero, Broken dam in northeast Nevada flooding homes, farms and
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unwillingness to invest in repairing the nation’s aging dam infrastructure
has already resulted in millions of dollars in damages and even claimed
the lives of some downstream residents.
As dams grow increasingly unsafe across the country, their harm
to river ecosystems are also becoming more acutely clear. Many dams
flood river valleys, altering the natural beauty of the surrounding landscape. One notable example of the potential aesthetic and environmental
harm associated with dams involves the O’Shaughnessy Dam in northern
California.8 For decades, the O’Shaughnessy Dam and the entire Hetch
Hetchy system have supplied nearly all of the City of San Francisco’s
municipal drinking water.9 To do so, the O’Shaughnessy Dam floods the
Hetch Hetchy Valley, whose beauty is said to have rivaled the neighboring Yosemite Valley before the former became a reservoir.10 The flooding
of the Hetch Hetchy Valley has been a source of controversy and conflict for
nearly as long as the O’Shaughnessy dam has existed.11 It is an infamous
example of the environmental costs associated with dams and of the intensifying pressure to remove many of these structures from rivers across
the western United States.12
In addition to creating environmental and aesthetic concerns, the
presence of dams on western rivers in the United States has also resulted
in the collapse of fish populations in regions such as the Pacific Northwest13 and the Colorado River Basin.14 In 2002 alone, over 70,000 fish
washed ashore in northern California as a result of extensive damming
railroads, KSL (Feb. 8, 2017, 10:38 PM), https://www.ksl.com/article/43126767/broken-dam
-in-northeast-nevada-flooding-homes-farms-and-railroads [https://perma.cc/FF9W-YZQK].
8
See Sarah E. Null & Jay R. Lund, Reassembling Hetch Hetchy: Water Supply Without
O’Shaughnessy Dam, 42 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N 395, 398, 402 (2006).
9
Id. at 395 (“The Hetch Hetchy System provides San Francisco with most of its water
supply. O’Shaughnessy Dam is one component of this system, providing approximately
25 percent of water storage for the Hetch Hetchy System . . . .”).
10
Brian E. Gray, Hetch Hetchy: To Drain or Not to Drain, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1263
(2005) (“John Muir said that there are so many cascades and waterfalls on the Tuolumne
that they surpass any other river system in the whole Sierra Nevada mountain range in
beauty and glory.”).
11
Null & Lund, supra note 8, at 395 (“Throughout the past century, the idea of removing
O’Shaughnessy Dam to restore Hetch Hetchy Valley has never entirely gone away . . . ”).
12
As the most recent example to remove the O’Shaughnessy Dam, see Restore Hetch
Hetchy v. City & Cty. of S.F., 236 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417, 420 (Cal. App. 5th 2018).
13
David N. Allen, The Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement: Federal Law, Local
Compromise, and the Largest Dam Removal Project in History, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.
ENV’T L. & POL’Y 427, 429 (2010).
14
Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The Elevation of Social
Engineering over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 896, 897–98 (2008) (describing the declining population
of the humpback chub in the Colorado River due, in part, to Glen Canyon Dam).
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on the Klamath River.15 The Klamath River fish incident gained national
attention,16 ultimately resulting in commitments to remove several dams
on the river.17 Dams equipped with fish ladders in the same region have
drawn criticism as well for their propensity to block the spawning paths of
salmon from the Pacific Ocean to their historic inland spawning waters.18
Meanwhile, allocated rivers, such as the San Joaquin and the Colorado,
increasingly run dry before reaching their deltas, thereby preventing
spawning salmon from moving upstream19 and decimating downstream
riparian habitats on those rivers as well.20
In recent decades, a combination of crumbling infrastructure and
increased awareness of the harmful environmental effects of damming has
spurred a growing movement to remove many dams across the United
States.21 Since the 1970s, over 1,200 U.S. dams have been removed due to
safety concerns, or to improve river ecologies across the country.22 Early

15

Allen, supra note 13, at 429–30 (“In 2002, the plight of the Klamath River salmon became national news when an estimated 79,000 adult chinook salmon died in the lower
forty miles of the river.”).
16
Id. at 430.
17
Id. (“For PacifiCorp, a private electric company whose license to operate four hydroelectric dams on the Klamath River would need to be renewed in two years, the national
attention was bad timing.”).
18
For a discussion of how technologies that were supposed to mitigate dam effects on fish
populations have failed, see J. Jed Brown et al., Fish and Hydropower on the U.S. Atlantic
Coast: Failed Fisheries Policies from Half-Way Technologies, 6 CONSERVATION LETTERS
280, 280–83 (2013).
19
See Nathan Matthews, Rewatering the San Joaquin River: A Summary of the Friant Dam
Litigation, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1109, 1110 (2007) (“The Friant litigation is only now drawing
to a close. In fall 2006, eighteen years after the complaint was filed, the parties conditionally approved a settlement that will restore flows to the San Joaquin River. If Congress
passes the settlement’s enabling legislation, water could begin to flow through the main
stem of the San Joaquin in 2009, and Chinook salmon could be reintroduced to the river
by 2012.”).
20
Jim Robbins, Restoring the Colorado: Bringing New Life to a Stressed River, YALE ENV’T
360 (Feb. 14, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/restoring-the-colorado-bringing-new
-life-to-a-stressed-river [https://perma.cc/NBK4-Z53T] (“The pale green river flows smack
into the Morelos Dam on the U.S.-Mexico border, and virtually all of it is immediately diverted into a large irrigation canal that waters a mosaic of hundreds of fields—alfalfa,
asparagus, lettuce, and other vegetables, their vivid green color clashing against the sere
desert. The slender thread of water that remains in the Colorado’s channel continues to
flow south but is soon swallowed up by a sea of sand, far short of its delta, which lies 100
miles farther on.”).
21
Molly Pohl, Bringing Down our Dams: Trends in American Dam Removal Rationales,
38 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N 1511, 1513 (2007).
22
See J. Ryan Bellmore et al., Status and Trends of Dam Removal Research in the United
States, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV.’S JOHN WESLEY POWELL CTR. ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS 1, 1
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dam removal efforts focused on those dams deemed the most economically
unproductive, structurally unsound, and ecologically harmful.23 A lack of
continuing economic benefits from maintaining these dams limited the
degree of controversy surrounding their removal.24
Even more recently, dam removal advocates have begun shifting
their focus onto larger dams or dam systems whose removal is far more
contested. Many of these larger dams still produce sizable benefits that
must be weighed against their harms. Landowners, dam operators, and
surrounding communities have resisted efforts to remove these larger dams
because of their economic interests in these dams’ continued operation.25
For example, the Klamath River’s dams assist with flood control and
protect valuable irrigation and drinking water supplies.26 On the other
hand, these dams also threaten other important interests such as river
(2016) (“Today, however, over 1200 dams have been removed, and the majority of these
dams were removed within the last two decades. Dam removal is now considered as a viable
option when the cost of keeping a dam in place exceeds the expense of its removal, particularly in locations where the possibilities for river restoration are high.”) (footnotes omitted);
see also Pohl, supra note 21, at 1513 (“Environmental rationales were cited most often
as the motivation for removing a dam. . . [s]afety was also a leading rationale. . . .”).
23
The CRS report highlights two dam removal projects—the Elwha and Glines Canyon
Dams—as examples of Dam Owners removing economically unproductive dams when facing
high maintenance costs. Nic Lane, Dam Removal: Issues, Considerations, and Controversies,
CONG. RES. SERV. 4 (2006) (“Dam owners often consider removal because of the costs associated with maintaining the projects. These costs include normal maintenance and upgrades to improve safety and meet regulatory requirements. Regulatory costs may include
costs associated with mitigating environmental damage caused by the dam and could
include altered dam configuration, operational changes, or habitat repair, to name a few
common examples.”).
24
Id.
25
See Brad Plumer, Environmentalists and Dam Operators, at War for Years, Start Making
Peace, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/13/climate/environ
mentalists-hydropower-dams.html [https://perma.cc/A4HG-H25B] (“[O]ver the past 50
years, conservation groups have rallied to block any large new dams from being built,
while proposals to upgrade older hydropower facilities or construct new water-powered
energy-storage projects have often been bogged down in lengthy regulatory disputes over
environmental safeguards.”). See also Matthews, supra note 19, at 110, for a discussion
of the contentious battle over Friant Dam; Restore Hetch Hetchy, 236 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417,
420–21 (Cal. App. 5th 2018) for discussion over the fight over O’Shaughnessy Dam; Save the
Colo. v. United States DOI, No. CV-19-08285-PCT-MTL, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71635, *3
(D. Ariz. Apr. 23, 2020) for background on recent litigation over Glen Canyon Dam; N.W.F.
v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 869 (D. Or. 2016) for background on
the ongoing dispute of hydroelectric dams on the lower Snake River. All recent examples
together show that larger, hydroelectric dams are harder to remove.
26
See THE KLAMATH PROJECT, U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. 2, https://www.usbr.gov/mp
/kbao/aboutus/multimedia/klamath-project/video-508caption-version.pdf [https://perma.cc
/GV4W-C6BL] (last updated Sept. 29, 2020).
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ecology and native water and fishing rights, and thus, inherently involve
broader groups of diverse stakeholders.27 Unfortunately, the current relicensing and reevaluation processes for larger dams through FERC, the
Army Corps of Engineers, and other government agencies do not adequately account for all the myriad interests and stakeholder concerns
associated with maintaining or decommissioning dams. As a result, dissatisfied parties—often, environmental advocates—are increasingly opposing applications to relicense or update dams.28
Formalized stakeholder collaboration, which is not a new concept
in water law and resource management,29 could potentially mitigate some
of the tension surrounding decisions about dam removal and relicensing.
Formal stakeholder groups are an increasingly important tool in the management of rivers, river basins, and watersheds.30 Stakeholder collaborations working with federal agencies are also common in the public land
management context.31 Recent collaborative efforts in the Klamath River
Dam removal project have shown that stakeholder groups can promote
greater citizen involvement and more equitable outcomes in connection
with dam removals.32 The reality is that many dams will be removed in

27
As an example, the stakeholder engagement report prepared by the State of Washington
highlights differing views on maintaining dams on the Snake River. Note that the stakeholder engagement was not prepared by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which operates
the four dams on the lower Snake River. KRAMER CONSULTING ET AL., LOWER SNAKE RIVER
DAMS STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT REPORT 1 (Dec. 20, 2019) (“Salmon, orca, agriculture and
energy are fundamental to Washington’s past and future. They symbolize who we are as
residents of the Pacific Northwest and define our communities and our economy. The lower
Snake River dams touch all these issues since their construction over 40 years ago. They
represent positive gains to the economy and local communities in southeast Washington as
well as losses to tribal and fishing communities. The future of the LSRD is inextricably
linked to the future of southeast Washington, Washington state and the Pacific Northwest.”).
28
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
29
See generally Lawrence Susskind et al., Collaborative Planning and Adaptive Management
in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 1, 21–22 (2010); Christy McCann,
Dammed if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: FERC’s Tribal Consultation Requirement and the
Hydropower Re-Licensing at Post Falls Dam, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 411, 419–22 (2006).
30
William D. Leach & Neil W. Pelkey, Making Watershed Partnerships Work: A Review
of the Empirical Literature, 127 J. WATER RES. PLAN. MGMT. 378, 378–79 (2001).
31
Antony S. Cheng, Build It and They Will Come? Mandating Collaboration in Public
Lands Planning and Management, 46 NAT. RES. J. 841, 841 (2006) (“Public lands are also
places in which Americans work out the ever-changing relationships with one another
with respect to the natural world, from debates over the appropriate role of government
regulation to whether private entities should be able to benefit from the use of public
forests. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the participants in this grand social experiment are turning to collaboration as a primary way to work out these relationships.”).
32
See Allen, supra note 13, at 468 (In agreeing to remove the dams, “for the first time in
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the next several decades.33 Whether or not these dam decommissioning
activities proceed efficiently and equitably will depend, in part, on whether
a well-crafted governance structure is in place to impact that process.
Formalizing stakeholder collaboration with FERC and the other primary
agencies responsible for dam governance, before dam relicensing or
reevaluation efforts begin, could do much to improve the decision-making
process for all involved. When removing a dam is the wrong choice, such
cooperation promotes more equitable and democratic management of
water resources on contested rivers.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the history of dams in the
United States and highlights the costs and benefits of dams and the current dam removal effort. Part II outlines the major overlapping interests in
larger hydroelectric dams that are most commonly at issue in dam decommissioning plan proceedings. Part III suggests that formalized stakeholder
collaborations would be more effective than the current dam relicensing
processes at addressing and incorporating major interests in dam decommissioning and relicensing decisions.
I.

THE NATION’S DAM PROBLEM AND WHY IT IS GETTING WORSE

Dams provide a host of benefits and are an integral part of the
United States’ infrastructure. But, with those benefits, there are significant
societal and ecological impacts that call into question whether dams should
remain fixtures in the broader landscape of natural resource management. However, current processes to reevaluate dams do not adequately
address the complete picture of interests for and against keeping dams.
A.

A Legacy of Dam Building

The economic and societal landscape of the United States would
be unrecognizable34 without the nation’s thousands of dams that store
the history of the Klamath Basin, environmentalists and farmers, ranchers and fishermen,
tribes, states, and the federal government agree on the path ahead.”).
33
See Pohl, supra note 21, at 1518 (“While most dams continue to provide sufficient benefits
to warrant retaining the structure, this study indicates that dam removal is becoming increasingly common.”); Brian Chaffin & Hannah Gosnell, Beyond Mandatory Fishways:
Federal Hydropower Relicensing as a Window of Opportunity for Dam Removal and Adaptive
Governance of Riverine Landscapes in the United States, 10 WATER ALT. 819, 821 (2017)
(“[M]any of the original FERC licenses have expired or will expire before 2030 and the next
decade will see a growing number of relicensing processes taking place around the US.”).
34
Michelle Ho et al., The Future Role of Dams in the United States of America, 53 WATER
RES. RSCH. 982, 983 (2017).
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water, provide power, and prevent billions in flood damage each year.35
The U.S. federal government has been involved in dam construction and
management activities since shortly after the Revolutionary War. Following
in the French tradition of civil engineering corps, the United States formed
the Army Corps of Engineers (“USACE”) in 1802 to build dams aimed at
improving navigation on major river systems.36 In 1826, Congress passed
the River and Harbors Act, expanding the USACE’s work in waterway
engineering.37 The Act authorized the construction of twenty projects from
the Great Lakes to the Atlantic.38 These early dam building projects in
the eastern United States focused on improving flood control and navigation on major river systems for improved steamboat operation, a critical
source of transportation and shipping in the early United States.39
As the United States pushed westward under the banner of manifest destiny in the late nineteenth century, the roles of dams evolved and
expanded. Arid western states could not support rain-fed agriculture, so
dams became critical for providing reliable irrigation and drinking water
to many western communities. Recognizing the importance of dams for the
western frontier, Congress enacted the Reclamation Act 1902, and thereby
created the Bureau of Reclamation.40 The Bureau ultimately became responsible for the construction of major dams like the Hoover Dam and
Glen Canyon Dam.41 The Bureau’s dam projects, which provided more
35
See id. (“Around 20% of dams listed in the national inventory of dams are primarily used
for flood control, reducing the risks of loss of life and property to millions with potential flood
exposure. Estimates indicate that over $5 billion of flood damage has been circumvented to
date by flood control dams and levees in both the Central Valley, California, and the
Tennessee Valley, respectively, while investments in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
flood control structures have an estimated sixfold return in terms of flood loss prevention.”).
36
See DAVID P. BILLINGTON ET AL., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND RECLAMATION,
THE HISTORY OF LARGE FEDERAL DAMS: PLANNING, DESIGN, AND CONSTRUCTION, IN THE
ERA OF BIG DAMS, at iii (2005) (“The history of federal involvement in dam construction
goes back at least to the 1820s, when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built wing dams
to improve navigation on the Ohio River.”).
37
Id. at 14–16.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 13 (“The Corps’ water projects in the early nineteenth century focused primarily on
navigation. With the economic climate of the nation improving after the War of 1812, the
steamboat came of age. In the West, the steamboat was vital to commerce and travel.
Only 17 steamboats operated on western rivers in 1817, but there were no less than 727
by 1855.”).
40
Ho et al., supra note 34, at 984 (“The passage of the Reclamation Act by Congress in
1902 led to the creation of the Bureau of Reclamation and the construction of major dams
for irrigation and hydroelectric production in the West, such as the Hoover Dam and Glen
Canyon Dam, each over 200 m tall.”).
41
Id.
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dependable sources of power and water, increased urban development in
the arid West.42 Policymakers acting during this era, marked by what
became known as the “hydraulic mission,” viewed any water that reached
the ocean as waste of a valuable commodity.43 These policymakers viewed
water as a “tamable”44 commodity, which needed to be dammed, just as
the rest of the western frontier was “tamed” by the expanding country and
industrial economy.45 While “taming” the West and western rivers with
dams shaped much of the country into what it is today, many of those dams
were sited without consideration of modern understandings of social equity
and environmental stewardship.
1.

Benefits of Dams

Dams can provide numerous benefits for surrounding landowners
and for entire river basins. Accordingly, stakeholders in river basins
often have a variety of diverse and competing interests in the management and continued operation of dams. These interests are divisible into
two distinct categories: (1) land use interests; and (2) energy interests.
Land use interests focus primarily on dams’ unique ability to provide flood
protection, recreational amenities, and steady water supplies. By contrast,
energy interests center on dams’ capacity to generate clean, reliable, and
renewable hydroelectric power.
a.

Land Use Interests

Dams across the United States support nearby land uses in countless ways, including through their provision of recreation areas, flood
control and water storage.46 Although it might seem easy at first glance
42

Id. (“[The Reclamation] Act was perhaps the most transformative legislation in the
history of the western United States enabling urban, energy, and irrigated agricultural
development.”).
43
See Ahmet Conker & Hussam Hussein, Hydraulic Mission at Home, Hydraulic Mission
Abroad? Examining Turkey’s Regional ‘Pax-Aquarum’ and Its Limits, 11 SUSTAINABILITY
228, 228 (2019).
44
See id. (We have chosen to include outdated language to reflect outdated historical views
of water management.)
45
Jeremy Allouche, The Multi-Level Governance of Water and State Building Processes:
A Longue Durée Perspective, in THE POLITICS OF WATER: A SURVEY 45, 60–61 (Kai Wegerich
& Jeroen Warner eds., 2010).
46
TIMOTHY J. RANDLE & JENNIFER BOUNTRY, DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
DAM REMOVAL ANALYSIS GUIDELINES FOR SEDIMENT, 6 (2017), https://acwi.gov/sos/pubs
/dam_removal_analysis_guidelines_for_sos_final_vote_2017_12_22_508.pdf [https://perma
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to discount the importance of the recreational benefits of dams, many
large reservoirs have created communities that are heavily dependent on
the tourism generated by water recreation.47 For instance, a visitor survey
conducted in the City of Page, Arizona, found that a majority of tourists
who came to the city visited nearby Lake Powell—a reservoir situated
above Glen Canyon Dam—and that tourism supported 2,874 full-time
equivalent jobs.48 The survey suggested that Page, which has a population of only 7,529 people, is extremely reliant on tourism revenue associated
with water recreation connected to the dam.49 Because many dams, and
the reservoirs they create, have major economic impacts like those in Page,
it is important to consider how a dam’s removal might affect local tourism and how such losses might be minimized.50
Flood control is another unique benefit of dams. For instance, in
Connecticut, alone, the USACE has spent $79.1 million to construct twelve
dams that have prevented $1.6 billion of flood damages.51 Not surprisingly, operators have removed very few dams that provide critical flood
control benefits.52 The alternatives to maintaining these dams generally
involve the development of expensive new canal systems, floodwalls, or
other substantial infrastructure projects.53

.cc/XE7J-K238] (“The current primary purposes for the U.S. dams in the NID include
recreation (28 percent), flood control (18 percent), fire protection (12 percent), irrigation
(9 percent), water supply (6 percent), and hydropower (2 percent).”).
47
Ivan Penn, The $3 Billion Plan to Turn Hoover Dam into a Giant Battery, N.Y. TIMES
(July 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/24/business/energy-envi
ronment/hoover-dam-renewable-energy.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=50C4EF
3103E4A196C11B2083933D985D&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL [https://perma.cc
/MGE5-87CE] (“The town (Bullhead City) thrives on the summer tourism that draws
some two million visitors to the area for recreation on the greenish-blue waters.”).
48
CHERYL COTHRAN ET AL., NORTHERN ARIZONA UNIVERSITY, PAGE TOURISM SURVEY 4
(2015) (discussing popular visitor activities and the economic impact of these tourism
activities).
49
QuickFacts Page City, Arizona, CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts
/pagecityarizona [https://perma.cc/Z76F-VQCG] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
50
RANDLE & BOUNTRY, supra note 46, at 11 (“In some cases, mitigation may be an important component of dam removal discussions involving social concerns. For example,
perhaps a new greenway with bike paths, fishing access, and river raft launch sites can
be included to replace lost lake recreational opportunities.”).
51
Connecticut Flood Risk Management Projects, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’S, https://www
.nae.usace.army.mil/Missions/Civil-Works/Flood-Risk-Management/Connecticut/ [https://
perma.cc/HL62-C976] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
52
Id.
53
Alcoforado FAG, Flood Control and Its Management, 1 J. ATMOSPHERIC & EARTH SCI.
1, 9–10 (2018).

82

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 46:71

Nearby communities also use water stored in reservoirs for applications that make many dams indispensable. Irrigation is a common use of
water stored in dams.54 For example, dams along the Colorado River alone
provide 7,000 square miles of farmland with reliable irrigation water.55
For this reason, dams can be particularly important for rural farmers.56
Some dam removal inquiries have concluded that removal is not an option solely because there was no realistic way to reliably supply water to
farmers without the dams.57 Fire protection is another common purpose
for stored reservoir water.58 This use has become particularly important
due to the increased intensity of wildfires.59 Some reservoirs even help
to supply steady drinking water supplies to communities, and when a dam
is relied upon for that purpose, removing it can have particularly devastating consequences.60
b.

Energy Interests

In addition to providing flood control, irrigation and recreational
benefits, many dams are also valuable sources of clean, dispersible, renewable energy. Hydroelectric dams account for a significant proportion of
the electricity mix in many western states.61 The Hoover Dam alone produces roughly four billion kilowatt-hours of energy per year, supplying
more than 1.3 million people with power in Arizona, California, and
Nevada.62 The Glen Canyon Dam, also located on the Colorado River, has
54

Id.
Felicia Fonseca, Environmentalists Push for Removing Dam Along Colorado River,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 2, 2019), https://apnews.com/e4dc62aed0bb4598868649887c8d
5657 [https://perma.cc/P4TQ-6RRD].
56
Presidential Memorandum on Promoting the Reliable Supply and Delivery of Water
in the West, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 714 (Oct. 19, 2018).
57
Associated Press, Federal Regulators Throw Wrench into Klamath River Dam-Demolition
Plan, L.A. TIMES (July 17, 2020, 4:39 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story
/2020-07-17/regulators-throws-wrench-klamath-river-dam-demolition-plan [https://perma
.cc/ZY4B-JFHR].
58
RANDLE & BOUNTRY, supra note 46, at 6.
59
See Wildfires: How Do They Affect Our Water Supplies?, EPA (Aug. 13, 2019), https://
www.epa.gov/sciencematters/wildfires-how-do-they-affect-our-water-supplies [https://
perma.cc/6RTG-NTRJ].
60
RANDLE & BOUNTRY, supra note 46, at 3.
61
See, e.g., 2019 Total System Electric Generation, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, https://www.en
ergy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/california-electricity-data/2020-total-system-elec
tric-generation/2019 [https://perma.cc/YQB2-FMWE] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021); Electricity
Mix in Oregon, OR. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.oregon.gov/energy/energy-oregon/pages
/electricity-mix-in-oregon.aspx [https://perma.cc/UWP4-TH7Y] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
62
Hoover Dam, Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
55
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likewise historically served as an important source of base load and peaking power.63 The growth of major urban centers in the Southwest, including Las Vegas and Phoenix, would not have been possible without the
power generated by hydroelectric plants on the Colorado.64
Hydroelectric power is a clean and climate-friendly source of
energy. Hydroelectric dams produce far fewer carbon dioxide emissions per
unit of generated power than traditional coal and gas-fired power plants.65
Hydropower is also fully dispersible, suffering from none of the intermittency problems that limit solar and wind energy sources.66 Accordingly,
it can be difficult and costly to replace a hydroelectric dam’s energy supply.
2.

Costs of Dams

Unfortunately, along with the numerous benefits that dams provide
come a host of harmful social and environmental impacts on river basins.
Stakeholders within river basins often cite these harmful impacts as
justifications for calls to remove dams and restore rivers to natural flow
conditions. This section discusses some of the adverse effects dams have
had on Native Americans and ecosystems along U.S. rivers.
a.

Effects on Tribal Nations

Throughout U.S. history, governments have often sited dams in
locations that disproportionately burden disadvantaged groups, most
notably Native American tribes. Dams disrupt the flow of rivers, often
creating a new lake where one previously did not exist. Land areas flooded
by reservoirs are also no longer available for development, potentially
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/hooverdam/faqs/powerfaq.html#:~:text=Hoover%20Dam%20g
enerates%2C%20on%20average,one%20of%20the%20country’s%20largest [https://perma
.cc/5SUT-ZU68] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
63
THOMAS MICHAEL POWER ET AL., The Impact of the Loss of Electric Generation at Glen
Canyon Dam, GLEN CANYON INST. ii–iv (2015).
64
See BILLINGTON ET AL., supra note 36, at 386 (“Water and hydroelectricity were intimately
woven with urban growth in general in the twentieth century.”).
65
Ilissa B. Ocko & Steven P. Hamburg, Climate Impacts of Hydropower: Enormous Differences among Facilities and over Time, 53 ENV’T SCI. TECH. 14070, 14073 (2019) (“Overall,
global median hydropower emissions are greater and thus worse for the climate than
nuclear, solar, and wind but better for the climate than coal and natural gas.”).
66
See Todd Myers, The Environmental Tradeoffs of Removing Snake River Dams, 53
IDAHO L. REV. 209, 216 (2017) (“This may change in the future, but there are limitations
to the amount of intermittent energy, like wind power, the grid can accommodate.”).
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harming nearby landowners.67 Generally, Native American tribes often experienced disproportionate adverse impacts from flooding above a dam.68
For example, the Fort Berthold Reservation had a significant portion of its valuable, irrigable land drowned in water backed up by the
Garrison Dam—a dam built by the USACE in 1953.69 The loss of that land
not only stripped the tribe of a source of food and economic development;70
ironically, it also caused the tribe to lose some of its water resources due
to the prevailing standard for calculating tribal water rights. Under the
Winters Doctrine71 and the Practicably Irrigable Acreage (“PIA”) standard,
tribes are allocated water resources based upon available irrigable land.72
When land flooded under the Garrison Dam, that land no longer factored
in the PIA calculation.73
Dams can also interfere with tribal fishing rights. Often treaties
with tribes allow them to retain traditional uses of rivers, including fishing.74 A conflict over fishing rights and the use of riverways was central
in the landmark case United States v. Winans.75 The Winans Court acknowledged that a treaty with a Native American tribe was a grant of

67

See S. Rep. No. 102-250, at 3 (1992) (arguing that the government provide just compensation to replace the lost economic base for the Fort Berthold Tribe after the Garrison
Dam flooded their arable land.).
68
See MICHAEL LAWSON, DAMMED INDIANS: THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN AND THE MISSOURI
RIVER SIOUX, 1944–1980, at 27 (1994) (“As a result the Pick-Sloan Plan disrupted the lands
of several native groups. Whether or not the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation
deliberately chose Indian over non-Indian land for their project sites as some tribal
leaders charged, their plans ultimately affected twenty-three different reservations.”).
69
Barbara A. Cosens, The Measure of Indian Water Rights: The Arizona Homeland Standard, Gila River Adjudication, 42 NAT. RES. J. 835, 861 (2002).
70
See LAWSON, supra note 68, at 59 (discussing how the Fort Berthold Reservation lost
over ninety percent of its best arable land under the waters behind Garrison Dam).
71
The Winters doctrine is the legal doctrine that stands for when the federal government creates a reservation of land, such as a tribal reservation, there is an implied right to water to
meet the needs of the reservation. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 575–77 (1908).
72
The PIA standard is the quantification standard used to determine the amount of water
reserved under the Winters Doctrine. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
73
Cosens, supra note 69, at 861.
74
See, e.g., Dana Johnson, Native American Treaty Rights to Scarce Natural Resources,
43 UCLA L. REV. 547, 548 (1995) (“During negotiations of the Stevens Treaties, representatives of the various signatory tribes adamantly refused to cede tribal lands to the
United States until provisions guaranteeing the Tribes’ continued right to take fish at
traditional fishing locations were incorporated into the treaties.”).
75
For Native Americans in places like the Pacific Northwest, fishing is “not much less
necessary . . . than the atmosphere they breathed.” United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
371, 381 (1905).
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rights to the United States from the tribe.76 As such, the tribe retained
rights not expressly transferred to the United States, including rights of
access to rivers for fishing and rights to certain amounts of river flow
needed to maintain those practices.77 Dams can potentially interfere with,
or infringe upon, these rights by disrupting natural spawning cycles for
many fish and reducing the flow in a river.78
Dams can also degrade or alter rivers in ways that interfere with
Native Americans’ religious interests. Tribes often view rivers as more
than mere sources of water and food. Rivers can be integral parts of their
religion and religious practices.79 For instance, the Yurok Tribe views the
Klamath River—or more accurately the salmon in the Klamath—as a
sacred resource.80 The Tribe recently asserted that the river had the same
legal rights as a person to protect the river from pollution and misuse.81
Damming a river sacred to a tribe could, potentially, be even more impactful than simply depriving them of fishing or water rights. However,
courts generally have not favored arguments supporting religious protections for sacred sites located off tribal trust lands.82 Therefore, a more
formal stakeholder collaboration arrangement might better support such
tribes’ perspectives.

76

Richard Griffin & Claudia Antonacci, Agua Caliente and the Argument for Aboriginal
Rights to Groundwater, 19 UNIV. DENV. WATER L. REV. 316, 320 (2016) (“While Winans
was not a water rights case, it contains a principle of Indian law applicable to water rights,
namely that treaties and other federal actions are not a grant of rights to the Indians, but
rather a grant of rights from them.”).
77
See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1413 (9th Cir. 1983) (the Ninth Circuit held
the Klamath Tribe possessed title to certain lands, hunting, and fishing rights, through
their treaty and “by the same reasoning, an aboriginal [or Winans] right to the water
used by the Tribe as it flowed through its homeland.”).
78
See Brown et al., supra note 18, at 281.
79
See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
80
Erin Gould, Salmon as a sacred resource in the Klamath, COLO. COLL., https://sites
.coloradocollege.edu/indigenoustraditions/sacred-lands/salmon-as-a-sacred-resource-in
-the-klamath-river/ [https://perma.cc/4HSU-EJ3B] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
81
Lulu Garcia-Navarro, Tribe Gives Personhood to Klamath River, NPR (Sept. 29, 2019,
8:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/29/765480451/tribe-gives-personhood-to-klamath-riv
er#:~:text=A%20Native%20American%20tribe%20has,status%20on%20the%20Klamath
%20River [https://perma.cc/C8FJ-9JBS].
82
The Navajo Nation tried to prevent the use of artificial snow made from recycled wastewater on a ski resort in the San Francisco Mountains in northern Arizona. The peaks are
sacred to the tribe but are not located within reservation land. The court denied their
argument that use of wastewater on the mountain (which the Tribe likened to desecrating
the Vatican) was a violation of their religious liberties. See Navajo Nation v. U. S. Forest
Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1028–30, 1046 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Ecological Impacts

In addition to threatening tribal interests, dams can likewise
create broader ecological harm throughout entire river systems. By blocking the natural flow of a river, dams prevent fish from an upstream
habitat that is critical to their spawning cycles.83 As discussed, damming
on the Klamath River caused one of the largest fish kills in U.S. history.84
Extensive damming in the Columbia and Snake River systems has similarly decreased fish populations and threatened the survival of the Orca
population off the coast of Washington.85 In order to improve fish populations, environmentalists advocate for the removal of dams. Evidence suggests that fish populations rebound following a dam’s removal,86 which,
in turn, encourages further dam removal on other rivers.87 Dams also
interfere with the natural temperature of rivers, potentially harming fish
and plant life that require seasonal changes in temperature. Before the
Bureau of Reclamation built the Glen Canyon Dam, the temperature of
the Colorado River fluctuated significantly.88 After the construction of the
83

John Waldman, Blocked Migration: Fish Ladders on U.S. Dams Are Not Effective, YALE
ENV’T 360 (Apr. 4, 2013), https://e360.yale.edu/features/blocked_migration_fish_ladders
_on_us_dams_are_not_effective [https://perma.cc/ZE3N-G6QK] (“For one species, American
shad, less than 3 percent of the fish made it past all the dams in these rivers to their historical spawning reaches. Results for other anadromous species (those that spawn in
freshwater and migrate to the ocean and back again) were nearly as bad.”).
84
See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
85
Michael C. Blumm & Doug DeRoy, The Fight over Columbia Basin Salmon Spills and
the Future of the Lower Snake River Dams, 9 WASH. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 1, 14 n.69 (2019)
(“Belying claims of salmon abundance is the tragic condition of Southern Resident Killer
Whales (Orcas), which are in danger of extinction due to a lack of food sources,
principally chinook salmon from the Columbia River. Orcas, which feed near the mouth
of the Columbia River in winter along their annual migration from southeast Alaska to
Monterrey, California, do not distinguish between wild and hatchery salmon. But low
salmon abundance in recent years has resulted in low reproductive success, and the
population is now down to fewer than 80 individual whales. Many scientists have concluded
that the best chance for recovery lies in removal of the LSR dams and a restoration of
more natural migration conditions in the Snake River, historically the largest supplier
of salmon in the Columbia Basin”).
86
See, e.g., Bryan A. Burroughs et al., The Effects of the Stronach Dam Removal on Fish in
the Pine River, Manistee County, Michigan, 139 TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES SOC’Y 1595,
1596, 1610 (2010); Matthew J. Catalano, Effects of Dam Removal on Fish Assemblage Structure and Spatial Distributions in the Baraboo River, Wisconsin, 27 N. AM. J. FISHERIES
MGMT. 519, 523 (2007); Emily H. Stanley & Martin W. Doyle, Trading Off: The Ecological
Effects of Dam Removal, 1 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 15, 20 (2003).
87
See Blumm & DeRoy, supra note 85, at 14.
88
Feller, supra note 14, at 902 (“Before the construction of the dam, the temperature of
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dam, the water temperature has become colder and has less seasonal variability than pre-dam conditions.89 This affected aquatic life that cannot
withstand the thermal conditions of the continual cold water released
from the dam.90
In addition to impacting fish ecology, many dams block the flow
of sediments downstream that are needed to naturally maintain riparian
and delta habitats.91 Dams, like the Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado
River, obstruct the flow of sediment downstream.92 While some tributaries below the dam still feed silt to the river, sediment load in the river is
at a fraction of pre-dam levels.93 Because of this loss of high silt levels in
the river, sandbars located on the river in places like the Grand Canyon
may periodically require repair to counteract erosive conditions.94 Likewise, extensive damming and over-allocation along the Colorado River
have largely been responsible for the demise of the Colorado River delta
on the Gulf of California.95
Although dams provide numerous economic benefits across the
United States, the environmental impacts and social inequities created
by certain dams casts doubt on whether they were worth the initial investment. Some dams are increasingly viewed as more costly than

the water in the Grand Canyon varied from near freezing in winter to around eighty
degrees Fahrenheit in summer, with a year-round average of around fifty-seven degrees.”).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 902–03.
91
See id.; J.D. Carriquiry & A. Sanchez, Sedimentation in the Colorado River Delta and
Upper Gulf of California after Nearly a Century of Discharge Loss, 158 MARINE GEOLOGY
125, 143 (1999) (discussing changes in delta sediment load and effects surrounding
ecology, including endangered species).
92
Feller, supra note 14, at 902 (“The drastic reduction in sand supply, along with the
change in flow pattern, has changed the physical environment in the Grand Canyon.
Beaches and sandbars in the canyon, if they are to be maintained, need to be periodically
replenished with fresh sand to offset the constant loss of sand to erosion by wind and
water. Before the construction of the dam, these beaches and sandbars were replenished by
the deposit of sand from the river during periods of high flows in the spring and summer.”).
93
Id. at 901 (“Tributaries entering the river below Glen Canyon Dam, primarily the Paria
River and the Little Colorado River, still provide some sediment to the Grand Canyon,
but the total sand supply is only approximately 16% of the pre-dam supply.”).
94
Id. at 902.
95
Robbins, supra note 20 (“The water that flowed in the once-lush delta has been replaced
by sand, and the cottonwoods and willows have surrendered their turf to widespread invasive
salt cedar and arrowweed. Without the river and its load of nutrients, marine productivity
in the Gulf of California—where the Colorado River once ended—has fallen by up to 95
percent. But despite the dismal forecast for the future of water on the Colorado, some
conservationists are hoping to return at least a portion of the delta to its former glory.”).
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beneficial, leading to a rise in dam removal projects and calls to restore
river ecosystems.
B.

An Imperfect Dam Reevaluating Process

The current process for relicensing and reevaluating hydroelectric
dams is well intentioned, but often fails to generate adequate engagement
with relevant stakeholders. One deficiency of the current dam decommissioning system in the U.S. is that there is no universal dam relicensing
process. State law governs most of the nation’s smaller dams, and the
process required for relicensing those dams differs from state to state.
This patchwork of laws can make it difficult to generalize the features of
the various relicensing and decommissioning processes through which
dams across the country are periodically reevaluated.
1.

FERC

FERC under the authority the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) regulates
all nonfederal hydroelectric dams, which include most large dams.96 FERC
generally grants 30-year and 50-year licenses to dam operators.97 Licensees must file a notice of intent to relicense their dam five or more years
before the license expires.98 An application for relicensing must be submitted at least two years before the current license expires.99 FERC conducts an environmental impact survey to determine whether relicensing
a dam will harm the environment.100 FERC is required to include in the
license any conditions prescribed by other agencies.101 This particular
requirement often means the incorporation of fish-ways to the dams.102
While FERC solicits comments from the public, the interests that it is
balancing are the environmental impact versus the power generated.103
The other substantial interests of a dam are not considered.
96

Shannon Morrissey, FERC and USACE: The Necessity of Coordination in Implementation of the Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1581, 1589 (2015).
97
Chaffin & Gosnell, supra note 33, at 824.
98
Application for New Licenses, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www
.ferc.gov/industries-data/hydropower/licensing/applications-new-licenses-relicenses
[https://perma.cc/EUZ8-9KQU].
99
Id.
100
Umpqua Valley Audubon Society v. F.E.R.C., 149 Fed. App’x 598, 600 (9th Cir. 2005).
101
Allen, supra note 13, at 433.
102
See id. at 431.
103
Hydropower Licensing—Get Involved A Guide for The Public, FED. ENERGY REGUL.
COMM’N 9–10, https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/hydro-guide.pdf [https://
perma.cc/523W-ZTVX].
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The FERC dam relicensing process is subject to review under the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).104 NEPA reviews only allow for public participation in a proposed action through a notice and
comment period.105 This type of public engagement is, therefore, reactionary to a proposed course of action that FERC has started considering.
This does not allow for more proactive and prospective public engagement found in stakeholder collaboration, leading to increased litigation.
FERC rarely considers dam removal as a first option based on cost and
potential environmental impacts.106 Not surprisingly, this process has
only led to a few notable dam removals based on changing perspectives
on dam management through the FERC relicensing.
Even if FERC does not recommend dam removal, the commission
may impose requirements that make the operation of dams uneconomical.
But the cost of removing a dam can cost millions of dollars. Because of the
high cost of removing dams, operators will only consider it as a final alternative. As an example, PacifiCorp, an electric company operating in the
Pacific Northwest, decommissioned the Condit Dam on the White Salmon
River based on the economic productivity of the dam. While FERC granted
PacifiCorp a new license, the commission required PacifiCorp to build new
fish passages on the Condit as a condition for relicensing the dam’s operation.107 Ultimately it was the dam operators who made the decision to
remove the dam, not the federal agency, even with the host of environmental issues with the Condit.108
104

See Umpqua, 149 Fed. App’x at 600 (holding that FERC was the appropriate agency
to conduct NEPA review).
105
NEPA requires that agencies solicit comments from the public, “[h]owever, the full
potential for more actively identifying and engaging other federal, tribal, state, and local
agencies, affected and interested parties, and the public at large in collaborative environmental analysis and federal decision-making [is] rarely realized.” Fredette, infra
note 166, at 140–41.
106
We found FERC’s dam removal policy—they actually have one—and we
wrote a letter to them addressing the 18 different points that they
needed to look at to determine whether they would even be going to
investigate dam removal. Most of the time, FERC never even
investigates dam removal. It ends up in the NEPA pile of alternatives
which isn’t considered further because they’re not going to do that, or
it’s infeasible. But we kept at it. We kept at it when PacifiCorp wouldn’t
meet with us for over six years. We used every means that we could.
CA Water Law Symposium: Removing the Dams on the Lower Klamath, MAVEN’S NOTEBOOK
(Apr. 22, 2020) [hereinafter MAVEN’S NOTEBOOK], https://mavensnotebook.com/2020/04/22
/ca-water-law-symposium-removing-the-dams-on-the-lower-klamath-river/ [https://perma
.cc/BHL8-J4KA] (quoting Michael Belchik, Senior Fisheries Biologist with the Yurok Tribe).
107
See Lane, supra note 23, at 3.
108
See id. at 4.
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USACE and Other Federal Agencies

USACE, the Bureau of Reclamation, and other agencies manage
the hydroelectric dams operated by the federal government under the
authority of various environmental statutes.109 Dams owned and maintained by federal agencies, like the USACE, also reevaluate dams under
a NEPA review. The NEPA reviews of these types of dams do not occur
based on an expiring license. Instead, the agencies undertake an environmental review and prepare an EIS to evaluate changing conditions in the
river system.110 These reviews address the continued, effective management
of dams while mitigating environmental harms. Like with FERC, federal
agencies will likely look to other alternatives rather than outright removal
of the dam.111 And, like with FERC, the NEPA reviews for other federal
agencies are subject to the same challenges from dam removal advocates.112
Although more democratic approaches to environmental and natural
resource management are beginning to gain traction in the United
States, top-down approaches still dominate the nation’s dam relicensing
and evaluation structures. A top-down agency review process does not
adequately include the perspectives of stakeholders, forcing opponents
of dams to challenge decisions through litigation. First, the decision-making
process to relicense or maintain a dam is through a central federal agency.
These agencies are unlikely to have the capability of addressing the localized issues surrounding dams. Secondly, the current decision-making
process relies on interested stakeholders to challenge it through litigation. This adversarial approach prolongs the decision-making process.
With many dams facing potential removal in the next few decades, a new
109

The most recent environmental review completed by USACE and the Bureau of Reclamation involved the dams on the lower Snake River, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS NW.
DIV. ET AL., COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
RECORD OF DECISION 1 (2020) [hereinafter U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS] (“The CRSO EIS
evaluated the long-term coordinated operation and management of the CRS projects for
the multiple authorized project purposes. An underlying need is to review and update the
management of the CRS, including evaluating measures to avoid, offset, or minimize
impacts to resources affected by managing the CRS in the context of new information and
changed conditions in the Columbia River Basin subsequent to the 1995 System Operation
Review EIS, with the RODs in 1997.”).
110
Id. at 4.
111
For example, despite the controversy surrounding the dams on the lower Snake River,
the agencies continued their operation. See id.
112
The EIS performed by the agencies and published this year was ordered due to continued litigation about the effects of dams on the Snake and Columbia River. See N.W.F.
v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 871 (D. Or. 2016).
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approach is necessary to better address changing perspectives and limit
costly litigation.
II.

THE INCORPORATION OF MORE DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES IN OTHER
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SETTINGS

As discussed above, dam management and decision processes regarding dam removal are complicated endeavors incorporating numerous
stakeholders—a complex resource governance challenge that is not unique
to dams. Water law and natural resource management are replete with
controversies involving diverse stakeholders competing for a single natural
resource, and there is growing interest in using more collaborative and
democratic governance structures to manage these situations.113
A.

Moving Beyond Top-Down Agency Action

The last third of the 20th century saw the rise of more collaborative
governance models in the United States as an alternative to unilateral
agency action.114 Over this period, top-down agency regulations increasingly gave way to more collaborative structures that better incorporate
stakeholder participation.115 In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”) to encourage and outline federal agency
cooperation with private groups.116 While agencies generally retain discretion not to use the formal FACA certification for their stakeholder groups,
the legislation still recognized collaboration as a viable method of agency
engagement with stakeholders. In 1998, Congress passed the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act, which has led to even more and earlier collaborations between federal agencies in connection with projects involving federal
113

RHETT B. LARSON, JUST ADD WATER: SOLVING THE WORLD’S PROBLEMS USING ITS MOST
PRECIOUS RESOURCE 102 (2020).
114
Lisa Blomgran Amsler, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the Incomplete
Legal Framework for Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 269, 274 (2009).
115
Id. at 272 (“Some have characterized the legal scholarship of the new governance as
a new form of legal realism, one that looks pragmatically at law in context and in action;
these legal scholars ‘seek[] to reinvent governance from the “bottom up” by rejecting
ancient administrative strategies of command and control and replacing them with a
continuous dynamic process governed by the relevant stakeholders.’”).
116
Id. at 313 (“[FACA] is an instance of federal legal infrastructure that anticipates a
collaborative network, namely the committee, but again ties it to a single agency as defined in the APA to preserve accountability. It also requires public records and the
availability of public participation in committee meetings to ensure both transparency
and accountability.”).
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natural resources.117 The legislation encourages collaboration and provides
agencies a tool to arrive at better decisions that benefit more stakeholders
without giving ultimate decision-making authority to those stakeholders.118
Natural resource stakeholders generally receive more benefits
when they participate in collaborative decision-making efforts than when
resources are managed solely under more conventional top-down governance regimes.119 Collaborative governance processes tend to more evenly
distribute benefits and costs among those affected by resource management
decisions.120 While some stakeholders gain more than others, generally
no individual is worse off for having participated.121 Stakeholder collaborations improve agency action by democratizing the decision-making
process and providing avenues for resource pooling.122 By relying on the
collective wisdom of the group of stakeholders, agencies are better able
to incorporate moral and social considerations that might otherwise be
overlooked in a top-down agency analysis.123 Through increasing public
involvement, stakeholder collaborations can help to overcome entrenched
views and political inertia and thereby promote greater overall acceptance of decisions.124
Well-developed stakeholder collaborations can furnish agencies with
much of the information typically obtained only through lengthy environmental reviews. As evidenced by the Four Forest Initiative (“4FRI”)—which
is discussed in detail below125—in certain contexts agencies such as the
U.S. Forest Service do not have to perform traditional reviews usually
117
Id. at 308 (“The . . . ADRA can be viewed as legal infrastructure intended to enhance
public participation through new collaborative processes . . . .”).
118
Karen Bradshaw, Agency Engagement with Stakeholder Collaborations in Wildfire
Policy and Beyond, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 437, 482 (2019) (“This observation should not be
misunderstood as a call for Congress to relax agencies’ decision-making authority over
public land and resources. The non-delegation doctrine and related laws exist for numerous
reasons, including to ensure that agencies manage resources in the public trust—for the
collective benefit of all citizens.”).
119
Karen Bradshaw, Stakeholder Collaboration as an Alternative to Cost-Benefit Analysis,
2019 BYU L. REV. 655, 672 (2019).
120
Id. (“The group voluntarily smooths the distributional effects of decisions by re-allocating
the benefits and harms. For example, a wildlife advocacy organization may agree to compensate ranchers whose livestock are killed by wolves reintroduced to an area, even though
the agency managing wolves has no legal obligation to compensate ranchers.”).
121
See id. (discussing Pareto superior outcomes to collaborative negotiations).
122
Id.
123
See id. at 680 (“Through the democratic process, the parties will negotiate until they reach
a Pareto superior outcome, in which both parties are better off than the status quo.”).
124
Id. at 689.
125
See infra Section II.D.
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required by NEPA.126 NEPA reviews are costly and take years, requiring
federal agencies to look at alternatives to planned federal projects that
have an adverse impact on the environment.127 But with 4FRI, the stakeholders were given the ability to weigh alternatives outside a traditional
review process, ultimately accelerating the process.128
Stakeholder groups can provide the ability to pool resources. The
benefit of stakeholder collaborations is that the group can do more than
any individual stakeholder.129 This includes the actual sharing of financial resources in the context of larger projects. The stakeholder collaboration that formed out of the Klamath dam removal projects was able to
distribute costs more evenly, making the prospect of tearing down dams
more acceptable to dam operators.130 In addition, other stakeholder collaborations have become a critical component of managing a variety of
natural resources from public land management and general stream
adjudications to water releases from dams on major river systems.
B.

Lessons from Water Law

Water resource management is another area where stakeholders
have implemented collaborations successfully. The Glen Canyon Adaptive
126

A forest service supervisor once stated about 4FRI:
What’s beautiful about this group, and what it offers us, is that we don’t
have to do traditional NEPA. That is the nice thing about a group and
the social context around it. Ideally, we would just have one alternative
and compare it to the no action and be good to go.
Bradshaw, supra note 118, at 472 (“The clear implication from the Supervisor’s response
was that 4FRI was the appropriate forum for public involvement—that if a group or
individual cared about the outcome, the appropriate forum was the collaborative, not the
NEPA process.”).
127
See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321–4347.
128
Bradshaw, supra note 118, at 472.
129
Bradshaw, supra note 119, at 689 (“By pooling capacities, the group can jointly achieve
more than any individual stakeholder could achieve alone.”).
130
See Allen, supra note 13, at 459 (“The KHSA funds dam removal from two sources:
surcharges on PacifiCorp’s customers in Oregon and California (customer contribution);
and the sale of general obligation bonds in California (bonds). The customer contribution
would raise $200 million by 2020 and would be applied first. California’s sale of bonds
would bridge the gap between the $200 million customer contribution and the actual cost
of facilities removal, if these additional funds are necessary for removal, but shall not
exceed $250 million. The total $450 million dollars represent the total state contribution
(‘state cost cap’) and no party is responsible for costs beyond the state cost cap. The KHSA
does not provide for additional funds if the project goes over budget. Indeed, PacifiCorp
and the federal government are expressly shielded from any costs or liability for removal.
Instead, costs over budget require the parties to meet and identify additional funding,
also potentially delaying dam removal.”).
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Management Plan (“AMP”) is an example of some of the successes and
drawbacks of a federal advisory committee. General stream adjudications
offer an example of collaborative groups in the context of complex natural
resource litigation.
1.

Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Plan

The AMP provides an example of collaboration through a federal
advisory committee.131 Glen Canyon Dam forms Lake Powell on the
Colorado River in northern Arizona.132 Due to concerns of downstream fish
populations and stream flow, the Bureau of Reclamation adopted the AMP
in the 1990s.133 This plan required formal stakeholder involvement, through
the Adaptive Management Work Group, in the operation of the dam to
improve river flow and fish populations.134 The AMP was a progressive
step toward more collaborative management of natural resources.135
The AMP has produced new opportunities for developing improved
river ecosystems following the implementation,136 but critics have argued
that this type of collaborative process is too slow moving for dam management, pointing to continued declines in fish populations downstream.137
While there is evidence of some success at Glen Canyon, it has taken two
decades to reach marginal results.138 The slow process at Glen Canyon is
not unique; it is a common problem with federal advisory committees and
why many stakeholders choose to avoid FACA certification. While not
131

Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, U.S. BUREAU RECLAMATION (July 19,
2021), https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/amp/index.html [https://perma.cc/3X54-6R5E].
132
Glen Canyon Unit, U.S. BUREAU RECLAMATION (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.usbr.gov
/uc/rm/crsp/gc/ [https://perma.cc/YLS2-RB37].
133
Lawrence Susskind et al., Collaborative Planning and Adaptive Management in Glen
Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUMBIA J. ENV’T L. 1, 3 (2010).
134
Feller, supra note 14, at 921, 930 (describing the goals of the AMP and the role of the
Adaptive Management Working Group, the stakeholder group).
135
See Sandra B. Zellmer & Lance Gunderson, Why Resilience May Not Always Be a Good
Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the Everglades, 87 NEB.
L. REV. 893, 898 (2009) (“It is the great uncertainty that accompanies complex restorations
that led to an approach called adaptive management. Adaptive management strives to
build capacity to anticipate environmental and social change and to inform decisionmakers and stakeholders of alternative pathways and the potential consequences of
choosing among those pathways.”).
136
Theodore S. Melis et al., Surprise and Opportunity for Learning in Grand Canyon: The
Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, 20 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y. 22, 22 (2015)
(“However, the experimental results from the Glen Canyon Dam program actually represent scientific successes in terms of revealing new opportunities for developing better
river management policies.”).
137
See generally Feller, supra note 14; Susskind et al., supra note 133.
138
Melis et al., supra note 136.
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perfect, the AMP has greatly increased stakeholder participation and has
proven useful over the two decades it has helped operate Glen Canyon.139
Stakeholder groups, working in collaboration with FERC and other government agencies, can learn from the Glen Canyon AMP while also avoiding
some of the slow processes that can hinder federal advisory committees.
2.

General Stream and Basin Adjudications

The length and complexity of general stream adjudications often
requires collaborative effort amongst stakeholder-claimants in order to
reach resolutions in decades-long judicial proceedings.140 Entire river
basins—some including thousands of landowners—are plunged into
decades-long court battles to determine the priorities of individual water
rights.141 One of the most complex stream adjudications in the country is
in the Snake River.142 Due to the size and complexity of the adjudication,
stakeholders in the river basin petitioned the court to form a steering
committee.143 Any stakeholder involved in the adjudication was eligible
to join the committee.144 The steering committee’s purpose was to make
recommendations to the Court and address issues proactively. By forming
the steering committee, stakeholders were able to democratize decisions
and resolve issues outside of litigation. This was essential in the smooth
progression of these complicated proceedings.145
139

See generally Feller, supra note 14; Susskind et al., supra note 133.
General stream adjudications are the most complex legal proceedings in the United
States. See Joseph M. Feller, The Adjudication that Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 ARIZ. L.
REV. 405, 406 (2007) (“The [Gila River] Adjudication is the largest and longest judicial proceeding in the history of Arizona, and is among the most complex judicial proceedings in
the history of the United States.”).
141
See Ann Y. Vonde et al., Understanding the Snake River Basin Adjudication, 52 IDAHO
L. REV. 53, 56 (2019) (“More than 158,600 water rights were decreed. United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia succinctly captured the enormity of this effort when
he observed that the number of water rights decreed over 27-years ‘works out to around
one claim every 90 minutes—an astonishing pace by anyone’s standard.’”).
142
Id. at 53 (“Initially envisioned as a 10-year process to catalog water rights at a cost of
$27.3 million dollars, the SRBA instead evolved into a 27-year long general stream adjudication that addressed some of the most complex water issues in the State’s history.”).
143
Id. at 65 (“In 1987, the State of Idaho, United States, and various private water right
claimants requested that a steering committee be formed to make recommendations to
the SRBA Court with regard to issues of common interest.”).
144
Id.
145
Id. (“The steering committee was made up of a group of stakeholders who agreed to
sit around a table to discuss issues as they arose in an attempt to deal with conflicts
proactively. It provided a forum for consensus building and allowed many issues to be
resolved through settlement discussions rather than through litigation.”).
140
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California’s state government has similarly mandated stakeholder
involvement in groundwater management to improve resource sustainability. In 2014, the California legislature passed the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (“SGMA”).146 SGMA mandated that local agencies
located in a groundwater basin develop sustainability plans in conjunction with interested stakeholders, including Native American tribes.147
By mandating stakeholder engagement, California recognized that local
communities understood the complexities of groundwater management
in their areas better than a state-level agency.148 The sustainability plans
developed in conjunction with local agencies and stakeholders have greater
public acceptance and avoid massive general basin adjudications.149
While these examples highlight successes for collaboration in general, their
structures are designed to achieve only specific limited results such as
avoiding lengthy litigation. A more formalized structure without the same
hurdles of FACA is more ideal for application in the dam removal context.
C.

Lessons from the Klamath River

The successful dam removal projects along the Klamath River
provide further support for incorporating more formal collaboration
structures into U.S. dam management. To date, the Klamath dam removal
project is the largest dam removal project in the history of the United
States.150 In 2002, 79,000 Chinook salmon died in the river,151 and overall, their population in the river has decreased by ninety-eight percent.152

146

Cal. Water Code § 10720 (West 2021).
See id. § 10723.4 (requiring GSAs to maintain a list of and communicate interested
parties in a groundwater basin); Guidance Document for the Sustainable Management
of Groundwater: Engagement with Tribal Governments, CAL. DEP’T WATER RES. 1, 2 (Jan.
2018), https://groundwaterexchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Guidance_Document
_Tribal_Governments.pdf [https://perma.cc/679L-5G6R] (clarifying that tribes are interested
parties for the purpose of CAL. WATER CODE § 10723.4).
148
See Alec D. Tyra, When the Well Runs Dry: Groundwater Policy and Sustainability
Post Agua Caliente, 38 UCLA J. ENV’T. L & POL’Y 309, 318 (2020).
149
See Eric Garner et al., The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act and the Common
Law of Groundwater Rights—Finding a Consistent Path Forward for Groundwater Allocation, 38 UCLA J. ENV’T. L & POL’Y 163, 209 (2020) (“GSAs provide a different venue for
negotiation than litigation, and they are in a unique position to bring together stakeholders
to seek groundwater sustainability solutions outside of a litigation context. In its development of a GSP, the GSA must consider and document stakeholder input.”).
150
Gillian Flaccus, Largest US Dam Removal Stirs Debate Over Coveted West Water, ABC
NEWS (Mar. 29, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/largest-us-dam-removal
-stirs-debate-coveted-west-69861899 [https://perma.cc/WR7Y-XG8C].
151
Allen, supra note 13, at 429.
152
Flaccus, supra note 150.
147
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This has brought greater attention to the environmental problems of the
river and reinvigorated a dam removal effort that had been in the works for
decades. The dams along the Klamath River are important to local tribes,
farmers, ranchers, homeowners, and conservationists.153 When a development project is this large, it is difficult to appropriately consider all of the
relevant interests. If the group left out an interest, litigation could dismantle the project. This project circumnavigated this issue by creating a
collaborative management organization, the Klamath River Renewal
Corporation (“KRRC”).154
The KRRC is a nonprofit dedicated to supporting all the communities of the river basin.155 The KRRC was formed by the signing of the
amended Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement (“KHSA”).156
Myriad groups and entities signed this agreement, including, “the States
of California and Oregon, local governments, Tribal nations, dam owner
PacifiCorp, irrigators, and several conservation and fishing groups.”157 Collaborative management enabled this large group with diverse interests
to have their needs considered, and a balanced agreement to be reached.
Importantly, the KRRC focused more broadly on sound river management and did not adopt a formal position of being pro- or anti-dam.
After hearing from all major interests, the KRRC was ultimately formed to
remove four of the many dams on the Klamath River.158 These dams are
used exclusively for power generation.159 They are not used for irrigation,
and they do not include fish passageways.160 In contrast, there are two
upstream dams, which were considered for decommissioning, that the
group agreed not to remove.161 Those dams are used for irrigating 300
square miles of farmland and have fish passageways installed.162 In short,
the collaborative management group was able to examine the nuances
of each dam and determine which were worth keeping and which should
be removed.163

153

Id.
Our Story, KLAMATH RIVER RENEWAL CORP., https://www.klamathrenewal.org/our-story/
[https://perma.cc/ELY4-V7FD] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Flaccus, supra note 150.
159
Associated Press, supra note 57.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
The Project, KLAMATH RIVER RENEWAL CORP., https://klamathrenewal.org/the-project/
[https://perma.cc/398Y-SVDW] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
154
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Of course, the Klamath River stakeholder collaboration was not
without structural problems. The initial model gave Congress ultimate
authority over approval of the Klamath dam removal plan.164 Once it
became clear that this plan was indefinitely delayed, they pivoted to a
plan that does not require congressional support.165 Although the experience with the Klamath highlighted the flexibility and potential of collaboration, pairing a collaborative stakeholder group with a federal agency with
final decision-making power would be more ideal in the dam context.
D.

Lessons from Forest Management: The 4FRI Partnership

The “4FRI” partnership is an example of a more formal, ongoing
stakeholder engagement with a federal agency that provides a promising
model for future collaborations, including those related to dam management.166 4FRI is a collaboration between public and private stakeholders
and the U.S. Forest Service that addresses the wildfire and forest management issues in four national forests.167 Notably, 4FRI is not a certified
advisory committee under FACA, underscoring how some stakeholder
groups view FACA certification as a barrier to natural resource management.168 While not a certified advisory committee, 4FRI’s stakeholder
group works closely with the U.S. Forest Service in addressing forest
management.169 After a series of devastating forest fires highlighted deficiencies in forest management strategies, multiple stakeholder groups
coalesced into groups that ultimately became 4FRI.170 4FRI’s goal today
is to move forest management away from fire exclusion to more adaptive
strategies such as controlled burns and mechanical thinning.171

164

Klamath River Restoration and Dam Renewal, CRS (Aug. 7, 2020), https://crsreports
.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11616 [https://perma.cc/ZQ9B-C3WC].
165
Id.
166
See Annette Fredette, 4FRI and the NEPA Process, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 139, 139 (2016) (“The
Four Forest Restoration Initiative (4FRI) is the largest collaborative, landscape-scale
restoration initiative in the country, the largest initiative of its kind ever endeavored.”).
167
What is the Four Forest Restoration Initiative?, FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE,
https://4fri.org/ [https://perma.cc/T5LD-MYV9] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
168
Bradshaw, supra note 118, at 470.
169
4FRI Overview, History and Accomplishments, FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE
(Aug. 2019), https://4fri.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/4FRI_Overview_Aug2019_final
.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB6J-F3UU].
170
See Diane Vosick, Democratizing Federal Forest Management Through Public Participation and Collaboration, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 93, 102 (2016).
171
What is the Four Forest Restoration Initiative?, supra note 167.
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Although 4FRI’s stakeholder group formed out of a diverse and
historically adversarial set of stakeholders in northern Arizona, it is not
an exclusive group and members of the public are free to join at any time.172
The Forest Service is not an official member of the stakeholder group.173
However, the Forest Service has several full-time staff members dedicated
to working with 4FRI on forest management.174 The 4FRI stakeholder
group created a memorandum of understanding with the Forest Service,
formalizing the collaborative process between the two groups.175 The
structure of the memorandum of understanding has aligned the collaboration and the agency’s goals for forest management.176
The alignment of interests between 4FRI and the Forest Service
has allowed stakeholders greater participation in the NEPA review
process. Through the collaboration, the stakeholder group took responsibility for drafting an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the
Forest Service.177 As such, the stakeholder group was able to proactively
address alternatives and reach consensus on planned forest management
policies instead of participating in the notice and comment period.178 At
a public meeting, when groups outside of 4FRI raised objections to the
plan, the Forest Service asked if the stakeholder group had considered
the objections.179 When the stakeholder group stated that they had
172

See Fredette, supra note 166, at 141 (“One of the reasons 4FRI is so unique, and so
successful, is the unprecedented stakeholder involvement. 4FRI builds on many years of
collaboration, research, and action since the mid-1990s. The 4FRI Stakeholder Group is
made up of individuals and groups, including members of local, county, and state governments; environmental groups, organizations, and institutions; and industry representatives.”); see also Who Are We?, FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE, https://4fri.org
/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/U7FD-HLSK] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
173
Bradshaw, supra note 118, at 470.
174
Id. at 472 (“Five full-time Forest Service employees are devoted to 4FRI. The Forest
Service provides 4FRI with an annual budget of approximately $33 million, comprised
of several different funding sources . . . .”).
175
Key provisions of the MOU outline clearly what 4FRI shall do, what the Forest Service
shall do, and what is mutually understood between the parties. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
FOREST SERV., FS AGREEMENT NO. 10-MU-11031600, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE 4 FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE (4FRI) COLLABORATIVE STAKEHOLDER
GROUP REPRESENTATIVES AND THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE (2011), https://4fri.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2018/04/MOU_with_signatures.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5RU-2DDH].
176
Id.
177
Fredette, supra note 166, at 139.
178
See id. at 142 (“Parties working collaboratively on a NEPA analysis can surface and resolve differences as they arise, thus preventing conflict and building agreements between
stakeholders. This was very evident during the objection process for the first 4FRI EIS.”).
179
Id. (“The Stakeholder Group’s extensive engagement in the development of the EIS
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considered the objections in drafting the EIS, the Forest Service concluded that it had been considered.180 The Forest Service’s approval of the
stakeholder group’s work showed that the agency now viewed 4FRI as
the appropriate public forum for NEPA considerations.181 In the end, the
EIS was adopted and implemented without challenges through litigation,
indicating broad public support for the plan.182
The best method to accommodate stakeholders in dam decommissioning is 4FRI’s non-exclusive stakeholder partnership structure formalized through a memorandum of understanding with FERC or other
agencies. Like the 4FRI stakeholder group, dams include a diverse number
of stakeholders.183 4FRI has built stakeholder consensus between groups
that have historically had divergent perspectives on forest management.184
The stakeholder group has done this without excluding any group that
may have otherwise wanted to join.185 With 4FRI’s help, the Forest Service
has been able to adopt forest management strategies with less risk of
public opposition and litigation.186 Public and private stakeholders interested in the management and decommissioning of dams would do well
to follow the Non-Exclusive Memorandum of Understanding (“NEMU”)
model exemplified by 4FRI.
III.

ADDRESSING THE DAM REEVALUATION PROCESS PROBLEM

Given the increasingly complex nature of dam relicensing or removal decisions, federal agencies should introduce reforms that better
integrate stakeholder collaboration schemes into the nation’s dam decommissioning processes. Dams are a central aspect of the nation’s current
water infrastructure, but are also monuments to an era when a rapidly
industrializing United States pushed aggressively forward into the western
frontier.187 While the dominant view of water management at that time
and draft ROD was acknowledged and appreciated in this last phase of administrative
review, and their involvement contributed to a successful objection resolution process.
The collaborative process with engaged stakeholders helped to narrow the issues still of
concern and made them easier to reach some level of agreement on.”).
180
Bradshaw, supra note 118, at 472.
181
See Vosick, supra note 170, at 93.
182
Id.
183
See Bradshaw, supra note 118, at 495.
184
See Vosick, supra note 170, at 102–03.
185
4FRI Stakeholder Group, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/4fri/home
/?cid=STELPRDB5292325 [https://perma.cc/HEP4-GZWG] (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).
186
Vosick, supra note 170, at 101.
187
See generally Allouche, supra note 45, at 61.
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was to use it as any other commodity in an industrial economy, more
modern views of water management require greater attention to broader
social, aesthetic and even spiritual considerations.188 As the views of
water management evolve to include a more diverse set of stakeholder
perspectives, so too must the method of hydroelectric dam relicensing
and reevaluation.
The growing calls to remove dams have come to a tipping point.
Proponents of dam removal are now targeting larger dams or dam systems
like those on the Klamath, Snake, and Colorado Rivers.189 These larger
dams are economically important structures for many stakeholders in
the river system.190 As the dam removal movement targets larger dams,
the number and diversity of stakeholders will naturally increase as well.
This makes it more important than ever to find processes that better
incorporate the range of diverse interests among adversarial groups.
A.

Stakeholder Collaboration as an Alternative

FERC and other federal agencies could greatly improve the dam
review process by mandating more formal stakeholder collaboration
schemes like those highlighted above. This would specifically improve
the process by increasing public participation of affected stakeholders
and democratizing the decision-making process.191 Collaborative input from
stakeholders can be achieved in a variety of ways, whether through a formal FACA committee or more informal collaborative groups.192 Agencies
188

LARSON, supra note 113, at 15–16, 26.
See, e.g., Kimberly Wear, Historic Klamath Dam Removal Project Takes Another Step
Forward, N. COAST J. POL., PEOPLE & ART (Jun. 17, 2021, 12:27 PM), https://www.north
coastjournal.com/NewsBlog/archives/2021/06/17/historic-klamath-dam-removal-project
-takes-another-step-forward [https://perma.cc/RP52-RNTP]; Jacques Leslie, On the Northwest’s Snake River, the Case for Dam Removal Grows, YALE ENV’T 360 (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://e360.yale.edu/features/on-the-northwests-snake-river-the-case-for-dam-removal
-grows [https://perma.cc/X8BA-ZHYN]; Fonseca, supra note 55.
190
See, e.g., LARSON, supra note 113, at 148; Leslie, supra note 189.
191
Using 4FRI as an example of the benefits of collaboration, the collaborative process
has created more consensus and developed better solutions to forest management. See
Fredette, supra note 166, at 143 (“But the results are clear, and are becoming clearer, as
we implement different 4FRI projects—that the same things that are challenges: the
scope, the scale, the extensive collaboration—have given us a better, richer process which
incorporates a wider range of interests and values, and leads to better decisions and
solutions for our natural resources and the communities that depend upon them.”).
192
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-472, FEDERAL ADVISORY GROUPS: DOT
AND DOE CAN TAKE STEPS TO BETTER ASSESS DUPLICATION RISK AND ENHANCE USEFULNESS
(2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589748.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TAJ-HF96].
189
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are already equipped with the institutional framework to allow collaborative input in other areas so making it policy for dam reevaluation is not
difficult to establish.193 The flexibility of stakeholder collaborations is ideal
for governing the more localized issues associated with dams in particular
river basins or systems, enabling federal agencies and stakeholder groups
to tailor approaches for each dam. While agencies can engage with stakeholders in a variety of ways, formal advisory committees are particularly
useful tools in reevaluating and managing dams.
1.

Benefits of Formalized Collaboration Schemes

Stakeholder collaborations tend to function most effectively in the
context of localized, highly contested decision-making processes. It is
often difficult for distant federal agencies to simply weigh clear costs and
benefits in these complex multi-stakeholder situations.194 By contrast,
interested local stakeholders are often well equipped to assist in the
decision-making process in these contexts in ways that accurately account for the unique characteristics of each community.195 Formal collaborations involving these stakeholders are able to provide more balanced
approaches to decision making processes that a cost-benefit analysis cannot
easily resolve.196 These balanced decisions derived from collaboration are
able to weigh and incorporate a diverse set of social, environmental, and
economic factors to inform the agency in the decision-making process.197
A decision of whether to remove a dam is the type of localized,
highly contested situation that is well suited for formal stakeholder
collaboration in agency decision-making.198 While dams are important on
the national scale, localized river basins and communities are generally
more burdened or benefited by a dam’s presence.199 The decision to remove
the dam particularly affects the local landowners and downstream
193
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communities that benefit from flood control, energy generation, and commerce from improved river navigation.200 Furthermore, the decision to
remove a dam is almost always critical, costing millions of dollars and
dramatically changing the environmental landscape.201 For these reasons,
dams are an appropriate subject for collaboration with agencies.
Two likely benefits of more formal collaboration between agencies
and stakeholders include improved implementation and greater public
acceptance of environmental review. As discussed, dam removal is rarely
a considered alternative in the environmental review under NEPA.202
Stakeholder collaborations prospectively consider alternatives before a
federal agency begins formal environmental review.203 Agencies then can
rely on the considerations and proposed alternatives of stakeholders
without having to undergo the lengthy process of a traditional NEPA
review.204 One example of agencies relying on the considerations of a
stakeholder group is the United States Forest Service’s reliance on 4FRI
to prospectively consider alternatives in wildfire management.205 The
same can be said for the steering committee in the Snake River general
stream adjudication.206 Similarly, stakeholders can address issues and
alternatives prospectively for dam removal. Because agencies like FERC
rarely consider removal as a serious alternative in the NEPA process
under current dam reevaluations, if the stakeholder group arrives at that
being the best decision, it can greatly improve and accelerate river
restoration without the need to challenge agency action.207 If a stakeholder group finds that dam removal is not the best option for a particular river system, the negotiations can improve the equitable management
of the dam, as is the case in the operation of Glen Canyon and the Glen
Canyon Adaptive Management Work Group.208
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Another benefit of stakeholder collaboration in dam removal
decision-making is the potential to pool resources to improve project completion.209 Dam removals are an expensive operation, with dam operators
generally unwilling to give up the economic benefits of dams in exchange
for the costs of removing them.210 Collaborative efforts in Washington and
California on dam removal projects have allowed dam operators to work
with stakeholders who would be willing to take on the cost of dam removal
to gain the social and ecological benefits of having a restored ecosystem.211
In Washington, the city of Snohomish made the decision to stop operating
a dam due to the increased costs of upgrading the aging infrastructure.212
Through collaboration, the Tulalip Tribe, having more expertise than the
city, took the lead on the dam removal projects.213 The town was able to
gain the benefit of not leading the project while the tribe benefited from
improved fish ecology.214 Both parties benefited from an improved relationship fostered through collaboration.215 Similarly, on the Klamath, collaboration was able to provide some funding to help remove the dam
projects.216 These two examples highlight the successes of collaboration in
its ability to pool resources, both financial and through technical expertise.
Stakeholder collaborations like those just described often garner
greater public acceptance than traditional agency action. Many communities and landowners often have invested interests in and are relying on
a dam’s continued existence.217 These stakeholders can reach a balance
between their interests through collaborative processes. On the Klamath,
negotiations allowed for upstream dams to remain while the group agreed
to remove dams downstream.218 Landowners continue to benefit from the
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flood control and irrigation of the upstream dams while tribes are hopeful
that the removal of the downstream dam stream dams will improve fish
populations and the river ecosystem.219 By bringing this set of opposed
stakeholders together, the collaboration on the Klamath was able to produce results that were more readily acceptable to them both.220 By establishing stakeholder collaboration as policy in dam reevaluation projects,
federal agencies and stakeholders can share in the benefits described
above in future dam removal projects and reevaluation discussions.
In summary, while every dam decommissioning decision is unique,
the examples of successful collaborations discussed above provide a useful
starting point for structuring groups in the context of dam removals.
Formal stakeholder collaborations can improve the environmental review
process by helping to evaluate alternatives and by ultimately increasing
social acceptance of the decision process. Stakeholder collaborations can
also improve the removal process by creating resource pooling for removal projects.
2.

A New Stakeholder Collaboration Structure for Dams—
The NEMU Model

The process of developing an optimal dam stakeholder collaboration scheme bears some similarity to the search for a perfect bowl of
porridge in the Goldilocks and the Three Bears fairytale. An ideal formalized collaboration structure for dam relicensing is capable of appropriately addressing adaptive management issues associated with a dam, but
avoids the additional institutional hurdles that currently plague the
FACA process. As seen by the Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Work
Group, FACA certified committees create hurdles to implementation that
ultimately freeze public participation.221 FACA does provide a formalized
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structure intended to increase public awareness and participation in
agency decision-making processes.222 However, FACA is inflexible, and the
certification process can take years.223 In addition, the statutory language
in FACA has created ambiguities in its interpretation, specifically when
and how it should apply.224 This ambiguity has created litigation that
further slows the collaborative process. Increasing the risk of litigation
is the opposite of what collaborations are trying to achieve in the dam
and natural resource management context.225 In this sense, FACA is the
porridge that is too hot for Goldilocks by being overly formalized.
Without a formal structure, collaborative groups run the risk of
being too limited in scope to effectively address adaptive management
issues like dam river restoration or major projects like dam removals.
Collaborative groups that are more limited in scope, like those associated
with general stream adjudications, are effective at limiting the risk for
potential litigation.226 However, these groups are too narrow in scope to
address adaptive management strategies that prospectively address
natural resource management. When less formal collaborations, like the
Klamath partnership, do address natural resource management issues,
there can be a problem with implementation of the proposed plan.227 The
Klamath Partnerships goals and interests at times were misaligned with
federal agencies, creating delays.228 In this sense, the “Goldilocks’ porridge” provides less formal collaboration.
The NEMU model, following the 4FRI example, has the potential
to be a “just right” collaboration for many dam decommissioning decisions. As discussed above, NEMU collaborations like 4FRI are nonexclusive, allowing membership to all interested in being a part of the
stakeholder group. It is also not the exclusive method of public participation with the federal agencies.229 While the Forest Service relies on 4FRI
to address forest management strategies proactively and prospectively,
222
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stakeholders who are not a part of the group are still free to engage with
the agency.230 The 4FRI group may be a favored source of public participation—and take a more active role in the NEPA review process—but
other, nonmember stakeholders can and do participate with the Forest
Service.231 In this way the NEMU model fosters more diverse perspectives without one stakeholder interest dominating the group. Nor does
the NEMU model dictate results; the federal agency still makes the final
decision on adopting strategies.232 In other words, this “porridge” provides
just the right amount of formalization.
In similar ways, collaborations following the NEMU model could
take a more proactive approach in addressing dam reviews outside of the
normal opportunities afforded to the public to address dam decommissioning questions during relicensing or review periods.233 This would
allow stakeholders direct input into drafting environmental reviews and
opportunities to address all alternatives available. FERC and other
federal agencies would still be responsible for the final decision but could
rely on the stakeholder collaboration more so than other stakeholders.234
This would build greater public acceptance, increase resource pooling,
and avoid litigation in the same way 4FRI has achieved those results with
the U.S. Forest Service.
One other advantage of collaborations under the NEMU model is
that federal agencies retain authority to implement such structures without
additional legislation or agency action. The only real obstacle left for implementation is the same as that for any collaboration: persuading a diverse group of stakeholders to agree to work together rather than against
230
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each other. While it is difficult to bring all interested parties to the table,
collaborations do work when implemented in a way that is inclusive and
addresses issues of significant importance.235
B.

Stakeholder Collaboration on Future Projects

Multiple large river systems in the United States with persistent
and growing dam relicensing controversies could benefit from the NEMU
model of collaborative management. Two such river systems are the Snake
River Basin and the Colorado River system.
1.

Snake River Basin

The nation’s next major dam removal project is likely to focus on
dams in the Pacific Northwest’s Snake River Basin. The Snake River
Basin’s characteristics mirror those of the Klamath River in many ways.
The death of 70,000 fish led to the Klamath dam removal projects, and now
widespread orca deaths have stirred conversations about the Snake River
dam removal.236 In 2018, an orca was filmed carrying her stillborn calf for
days.237 From 2007 to 2014, two-thirds of West Coast orca pregnancies
failed and no orca calf from this time period have survived more than
three years.238 A major cause of this tragedy is the near starvation diet
that orcas in this region live on due to the decimation of the Chinook
salmon population.239 The dams on the Snake River Basin have been under
heavy scrutiny for years because of their contribution to low Chinook salmon populations.240 Recently the USACE decided not to remove any of
the dams after finishing an EIS in 2020.241 The USACE’s environmental
235
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review favored other environmental mitigation measures to balance fish
ecology with the benefits that the dams produce.242
The economic benefits of the Snake River dam system are significant enough to justify maintaining some dams. As late as 2012, dams on
the Snake River generated 65 percent of the state’s electric energy.243 Since
then, the dams have struggled to sell their energy as other energy sources
have grown cheaper.244 Today, hydroelectric power in the region has become so uncompetitive that the electrical utility, which holds the Snake
River dams, now only needs six of its thirty-one dams to meet its contractual energy requirements.245 The other major economic incentive for the
dams, freight shipping on the river, has been reduced by 70 percent due to
more competitive shipping options.246 However, there are some farmers
who still rely on the river for shipping.247 Thus it makes sense that some of
the dams would be maintained. It is also clear that the USACE can and
should remove some of the dams. If the USACE were to remove the four
dams in the Snake River, the Chinook salmon population would increase
two or threefold.248
In its 2020 EIS, the USACE considered removing its four targeted
Snake River dams as one of its many alternative courses of action.249 The
report’s analysis concluded that choosing this alternative would produce
major long-term benefits for the salmon population and distinctly superior benefits to the other alternatives.250 However, the option of removing
the four dams was passed over because it would not meet the USACE’s
power objective.251 The power objective focuses on the need to provide
adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable power to the Colorado River
Power System.252 The USACE chiefly based this determination on an
analysis highlighting the potential decreases in power generation that
242
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would result and the infeasibility of replacing those resources.253 This is
an unsound rationale, because the targeted dams were not needed to meet
power generation obligations.254 Producing uncompetitive surplus power
should not have been a priority.
This EIS report is likely to result in more litigation. When the
USACE released the EIS announcing this policy decision, many members
of the public and local tribes expressed their distress at the decision not
to remove the four dams.255 U.S. Representative Mike Simpson, a Republican from Idaho, has even offered a proposed plan that includes breaching the four dams on the Snake.256 This shows these types of natural
resource management issues are not simply partisan issues, but rather
involve unique local perspectives. Environmental groups are likely to
challenge the USACE’s findings and the ultimate decision of the EIS in
a new round of litigation.257 This is particularly disappointing because
the 2020 EIS was conducted after a successful lawsuit asserting that the
USACE did not adequately evaluate dam removal in its environmental
review.258 This type of protracted litigation is a particularly prominent
shortcoming of the current management regime.
Collaborative management following the NEMU model could alleviate much of the political tension surrounding dams along the Snake
River. There are strong and growing interests in removing some of these
dams, and the current regulatory process has not effectively managed
those interests.259 Having more of the interested parties brought to a
table and given opportunities to discuss their various interests could lead
to less litigation and better agency decisions. As such, the interested
stakeholders should draft a non-exclusive collaborative management
charter and sign a memorandum of understanding with the USACE.
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Colorado River System

The Colorado River system’s current dam management structure
will also require significant change in the coming decades and could benefit
from the NEMU model. The Colorado “provides water to one in eight
Americans and supports one-seventh of the nation’s crops.”260 As water
scarcity has increased across the nation, more water has been allocated
than the Colorado River system supplies.261 This has caused several of
the River basin’s reservoirs to operate far below capacity.262 Lake Powell
and Lake Mead are two of the largest, and both operate at less than half
capacity.263 Thus there have been calls to drain Lake Powell into Lake
Mead.264 This would theoretically lessen the amount of water lost to
evaporation by decreasing the total water surface area across the two
reservoirs and reduce the loss of water drained through Lake Powell’s
more porous lakebed.265 The science on that question is not settled: proponents of combining the reservoir estimate 179 billion gallons of water
would be saved each year while opponents claim negligible quantities of
water would be saved.266 Regardless of whether the two dams should be
combined, the water scarcity problem has made it clear that the river
system management will need to be changed in the coming years. What
is equally clear is the fact that making any substantial changes to this
management system will be monstrously difficult.
The greatest obstacles to any major policy change on the Colorado
River system are political in nature. Combining the two reservoirs through
opening the Glen Canyon river dam’s floodgates would require “an act of
Congress, a new agreement among seven state legislatures, a revised treaty
with Mexico, and a lengthy federal environmental impact analysis.”267 This
massive number of stakeholders means that any change will take years
to negotiate and could very well be destined for failure if a formal collaboration does not consider every interest.
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A more formal collaborative management structure for the Colorado
River system could do a lot of good. In particular, the NEMU model is particularly suited to this kind of multi-party agreement. This is because the
memorandum of understanding can be a multilateral agreement between
any number of parties. Bringing the various governments into a formal
framework of collaboration with each other and stakeholders should
substantially expedite negotiations and reduce litigation. Klamath showed
that a multistate collaborative management group could successfully
change the management of a complicated system of dams. It is time to
bring collaborative management to the biggest and most complicated
system of dams in the United States.
CONCLUSION
Several aging dams across the United States need more modernized management approaches. Even when a dam is clearly generating
more costs than benefits, it can take an unacceptably long time to get decommissioning approval. While dam removal will always be a complicated and controversial issue, the nation’s current, outmoded framework
of dam management has become an unjustifiable contributor to these
challenges. Collaborative dam management following a NEMU model
like that highlighted in this Article could streamline and improve damrelated decision-making processes by increasing stakeholder involvement
and thus decreasing delays from political and legal disputes. The NEMU
model uses a memorandum of understanding to strike a more optimal
balance between a non-exclusive public stakeholder group and a river’s
managing agency. This structure allows the public to freely engage in the
decision-making process while also giving the governing agency a basis
to rely on the collaborative group’s work product. Widespread adoption
of such management schemes could greatly improve future large-scale
dam management.
The Pacific Northwest’s Snake River system is just one example
of a system that could greatly benefit from a more formal collaborative
management structure based on the NEMU model. The river’s current
management regime has led to severe salmon population reductions that
have caused local orcas to starve for more than a decade.268 Nonetheless,
the USACE recently approved a plan that prioritized energy production
over a solution to restore the salmon population.269 Sadly, the USACE
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made this decision despite there being four dams on the Snake River not
needed to meet electricity demands, whose removal would substantially
restore the salmon population.270 This controversial decision was not well
received in the community and is certain to spark more litigation. The
NEMU model would help the USACE to better understand the issues of the
community, and help the community trust the decision of the USACE.
These advantages of the NEMU model would result in better decisionmaking, and less litigation through clear communication.
The Colorado River system is also in need of a more formal collaborative governance structure and could benefit from adopting one akin
to the NEMU model. Any substantial change of dam operating procedure
“would probably require an act of Congress, a new agreement among seven
state legislatures, a revised treaty with Mexico, and a lengthy federal environmental impact analysis.”271 Dam removal projects on the Klamath
show that collaborative dam management fosters agreements between
many state and local actors that have been historically adversarial. The
experience of 4FRI’s stakeholder group as highlighted in this Article
shows that the NEMU model is a more effective framework for engaging
all major stakeholders in such complex matters and ensuring that environmental and other impacts get full consideration in the decisionmaking process. Changing the management of any dam on the Snake,
Colorado, or other major river systems will be a lengthy and arduous endeavor, but NEMU collaborative management will improve that process
by mitigating litigation, improving relations among various stakeholders,
pooling resources, and producing more equitable outcomes. By taking
proactive steps today to modernize U.S. dam relicensing and decommissioning, policymakers can help to ensure the nation’s aging dams are managed in the best interests of all Americans for many generations to come.
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